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In order to halt and reverse the arms race in the Baltics, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense 
must encourage the use of an existing transit pact between Russia and Lithuania before negotiating 
a mutual de-escalation. 
The demilitarization of Kaliningrad has three dimensions: Russia’s invasion of Crimea, 
Russia’s military presence in Kaliningrad, and NATO’s response. The Kaliningrad region, a small 
piece of Russian land in the Baltics, has once again become a key military stronghold aggravating 
tensions between East and West (Akulov, 2016). The 2014 annexation of Crimea convinced the 
Baltic states they would be annexed next, pushing them towards the West for protection (Ubriaco, 
2017). 
NATO responded by strengthening its forces in the region; this decision prompted a 
contained but escalating arms race (Andersson & Balsyte, 2016). This increased military presence 
assisted overall economic growth in Lithuania at the expense of trade; although trade has 
recovered, its percentage of GDP remains below pre-Crimea levels (World Bank, 2019b; World 
Bank, 2019d; World Bank, 2019e). Demilitarizing Kaliningrad would reopen the region to trade 
with Lithuania, adjusting this imbalance. 
The Ministry of Defense of Lithuania holds the responsibility to address this increasingly 
dangerous situation, as its primary duty is to preserve the security of Lithuania. Additionally, as a 
member of NATO, the Ministry of Defense is obligated to provide for the collective security of 
the region (Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, 2016). 
Under the Proposal for Baltic Stabilization, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense will work 
with the government to enforce an existing transit agreement between Lithuania and Russia before 
assisting in negotiations with NATO and Russia. The Lithuanian government must first invoke the 
transit pact to stop the flow of Russian military goods through its territory, with the Ministry of 
Defense providing supporting troops. NATO will pause its activities in Lithuania during this time 
to reduce the risk of an accidental escalation. If needed, the agreement will be invoked a second 
time to prevent any goods from reaching Kaliningrad through Lithuania. 
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By establishing itself as a regional power, Lithuania will be able to contact Russia from a 
position of authority. After conferring with NATO, Lithuania will tell Russia that NATO will 
remove a certain amount of military equipment from Lithuania if Russia agrees to move the same 
amount from Kaliningrad. Once this process has begun, Lithuania will request that Kaliningrad be 
opened again to Western trade. The Proposal for Baltic Stabilization will not only decrease 
regional tensions but improve general relations through economic cooperation. 
Background 
The Problem in Context 
Kaliningrad, a Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania, has become a militarized 
zone following the 2014 invasion of Crimea. Spanning just 6,000 square miles, the region is 
Lithuania’s only border with Russia (Morozova, 2016). Home to the Baltic fleet in Soviet times, 
Kaliningrad had seen a substantial decline in military equipment and personnel since the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Since then, the West has increased its influence in the Baltics, isolating the 
region even further from Russia (Oldberg, p. 353-354, 2009). 
It is safe to assume that Kaliningrad will play a large role in Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s imperial ambitions towards former Soviet territories (Hendrix, p. 1, 2018). The exclave is 
strategically important for its access to the Baltic Sea. Following Russia’s actions in Ukraine, 
NATO has increased its presence in the Baltics. Since then, the Kremlin has used NATO’s actions 
as justification to begin a parallel militarization of Kaliningrad (Akulov, 2016). These actions have 
resulted in a dangerous arms race on the borders of Kaliningrad (Andersson & Balsyte, 2016). A 
lack of dialogue between the two sides increases the chance that any skirmish, whether planned or 
accidental, could escalate quickly (Moniz & Nunn, 2019). 
Russian Invasion of Ukraine 
The annexation of Crimea horrified the West and led NATO to increase its forces in the 
Baltics, who believed that they would be annexed next. This annexation was the spark of the Baltic 
arms race. At the end of February 2014, the Kremlin sent military forces to legitimate Russian 
bases in Crimea. It was not until these forces began controlling access to Crimea from the mainland 
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that anyone knew what was happening. By then, the annexation was complete – the “smoothest 
invasion of modern times” (Simpson, 2014). Moscow justified its actions by citing the number of 
ethnic Russians in Crimea. Many of these ethnic Russians supported the annexation to gain access 
to the comparatively higher living standards in Russia (Khudoley, p. 6-7, 2016). 
Lithuania and the other Baltic states feared Russia would then annex the parts of their 
territories with large numbers of ethnic Russians (Khudoley, p. 6, 2016). However, while another 
annexation remains a possibility, the Baltics’ superior economic, political, and social conditions, 
not to mention their NATO membership, make an invasion unlikely. Ethnic Russians living in the 
Baltics enjoy greater opportunities than some do even in Russia. Additionally, Ukraine’s 
importance under the Soviet Union created a Soviet “nostalgia” that never existed among Baltic 
Russians (Khudoley, p. 7, 2016). 
Although the distinctions between Ukraine and the Baltics prevented a second annexation, 
the invasion substantively increased Baltic loyalty to NATO (Ubriaco, 2017). As individual 
countries and international organizations alike began severing military ties with Russia, the Baltic 
states asked for NATO’s protection against a possible invasion (Khudoley, 2016). NATO 
responded with a military build-up in the area, which backfired when Russia responded in a similar 
manner (Akulov, 2016). 
Russian Military Presence in Kaliningrad 
Moscow has increased its military presence in Kaliningrad as a display of power, which 
has damaged both diplomatic relations with the West and the Russian economy. In 2016, President 
Putin announced his intent to remilitarize the region in response to “threats” from Kaliningrad’s 
NATO neighbors (Akulov, 2016). To that end, the following steps have been taken: 
• The S-400 and Iskander-M missile systems were deployed to Kaliningrad in 2016 (Akulov, 
2016). A statement released in February 2018 revealed that the Iskander systems would 




• The Su30SM and Su24 fighter jets were also stationed in Kaliningrad in 2016 (Jennings, 
2018). 
• A motorized rifle division was added to the Baltic Fleet’s 11th Army Corps in early 2021 
(Barros, 2021b) in preparation for joint military exercises with Belarus (Barros, 2021a). 
Since 2017, Russia has violated Open Skies Treaty restrictions on flights over the region 
(Reif, 2018). Russia’s noncompliance led the United States to withdraw from the treaty in 2020 
(Department of Defense, 2020). 
Along with endangering collective security and the balance of power, the Kremlin’s actions 
have shut Kaliningrad off from the outside world, as it was during the Cold War. Kaliningrad was 
given “special trade status” in its dealings with its Western neighbors following the fall of the 
Soviet Union (Kelly, 2016). Kaliningrad’s economy and culture flourished because of tourism and 
trade with Poland and Lithuania. President Putin’s economic policies, however, have once again 
closed Kaliningrad’s borders to people and goods, encouraging instead the use of Russian raw 
materials. These “protectionist methods” (Kelly, 2016) have severely impacted a wider economy 
already suffering from Western sanctions (Sherr, 2016). 
NATO Military Presence in the Baltics 
NATO’s increased presence has boosted Lithuania’s economy at the expense of regional 
security. Directly following the annexation of Crimea, the alliance held the 2014 Wales Summit 
to negotiate its military response (McNamara, 2016). Under Article 5, an attack against one is an 
attack against all, and NATO feared Russia would invade the Baltic states next (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), 2018b). They formed the Readiness Action Plan, which created a 
task force of 5,000 troops. To avoid violating the NATO-Russia Founding Act, these troops would 
rotate through the Baltics (McNamara, 2016). 
The NATO-Russia Founding Act is a legally non-binding agreement asking NATO to 
refrain from permanently stationing troops in the Baltics and Poland. However, some believe 
Russia’s recent actions justify abandoning the act (Deni, 2017). NATO has responded to Russian 
violations of Baltic airspace with air policing (Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, 2017) 
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and joint military exercises between troops from multiple member countries since 2004 (NATO, 
2018a). These activities have furthered Baltic integration in NATO and improved the Baltics’ 
military capacity. 
Lithuania’s Military Spending and Economic Growth Over Time 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
GDP 46.514 48.575 41.419 43.018 47.759 53.723 54.627 
Military 
Expenditure 
0.765 0.88 1.135 1.479 1.716 1.9854 2.027 
Trade 155.887 142.722 138.552 134.454 144.873 148.639 149.693 
Imports 77.218 70.451 69.775 66.866 71.278 73.394 72.242 




NATO’s actions in the Baltics have 
shifted Lithuania’s economic focus towards 
its own military. While this shift initially 
damaged economic growth, it is now 
helping the economy to grow faster than it 
had before the invasion of Crimea. As 
shown in Fig. 1 and 3, Lithuania’s military 
spending increased in 2015, the year after 
the invasion of Crimea (Simpson, 2014), by 
double the amount it had the year before, 
and it has continued to rise (World Bank, 
2019d). 
Fig. 1 compares Lithuania’s GDP (billions of US 
dollars) to military spending (as a percentage of 
GDP) and trade (also as a percentage of GDP) over 
time. Data from the World Bank. Table compiled by 
author. 
Fig. 2-4 show Lithuania’s GDP (billions of US dollars), 
military spending (as a percentage of GDP), and trade 
(also as a percentage of GDP) over time. Data from the 
World Bank. Charts compiled by author. 
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Military spending started to replace trade as a source of GDP after the Russian annexation of 
Crimea (Fig. 1-4). Trade accounted for historic amounts of GDP in 2013. These percentages 
declined substantially in 2014, 2015, and 2016 before a resurgence in 2017. While trade has 
continued to grow since then, trade as a percentage of GDP remains below pre-Crimea levels 
(World Bank, 2019a; World Bank, 2019c; World Bank, 2019e).  
After a significant drop between 2014 and 2015, GDP has continued to grow (World Bank, 
2019b). Military spending has only increased during this period (World Bank, 2019d), indicating 
that military spending accounts for the difference. While the increase in military spending is good 
for the economy, it is dangerous for the political atmosphere (Akulov, 2016). Before Kaliningrad 
was closed off to the West, it traded freely with Lithuania (Kelly, 2016). Therefore, the economic 
effects of a diffusion in tensions would be offset by the resumption of trade between Kaliningrad 
and Lithuania. 
The militarization of Kaliningrad was caused by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
subsequent military responses from both East and West. While culturally pushing the Baltics to 
the West and isolating Kaliningrad, the militarization has had a positive economic impact in 
Lithuania. However, the security risks posed by this situation make the demilitarization of 
Kaliningrad a top priority for the safety and prosperity of the Baltics. 
Political Unrest in Belarus 
 In early August 2020, Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko won his sixth term with 
80% of the vote in an election that did not meet democratic standards (Taylor, 2020; Freedom 
House, 2020). Despite massive protests, Lukashenko has remained in power. The leader of the 
opposition, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, was forced out of Belarus and currently resides in Lithuania 
(Taylor, 2020). 
 Belarus is integral to NATO-Russia tensions because it acts as a buffer between Russia and 
NATO. Additionally, Kaliningrad’s economy is dependent on exports that travel overland across 
Belarus to Russia. Kaliningrad’s economy would suffer if Belarus pivoted away from Russia 
(Sukhankin, 2021). Therefore, the Kremlin views pro-Western movements in Belarus, including 
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the pro-democracy platform of Tikhanovskaya, as a threat. Putin has always advocated for close 
ties between Russia and Belarus, but his talk of unifying the two states pushed Lukashenko away 
in the past. Since the election, Putin has renewed talk of “integration,” causing Western speculation 
that an absorption may be a future possibility (Taylor, 2020). On top of rejecting the election 
results, the countries of NATO are wary of recent military coordination between Russia and 
Belarus (Mahshie, 2020). 
Client Mandate 
The Ministry of Defense of Lithuania 
Because the arms race in the Baltics is a military issue, the Ministry of Defense of Lithuania 
is responsible for its peaceful de-escalation. The department is accountable for the total defense of 
Lithuania within international law. This duty encompasses both national interests and NATO 
interests. Its top priority is towards its own citizens, but as a member of NATO, the ministry has 
the added responsibility of the collective security of the Baltics (Ministry of National Defence 
Republic of Lithuania, 2016). 
The Ministry of Defense’s main interest is the security of Lithuania, focused on improving 
the country’s military capabilities through advancing weapons technology and training soldiers for 
combat (Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, 2016). As Lithuania and Kaliningrad 
share a border – Lithuania’s only shared border with Russia – the nation is at an increased risk of 
attack (Oldberg, p. 354, 2009). Because of this situation, the ministry has even more reason to take 
initiative to diffuse tensions. 
The Ministry of Defense has an additional stake in the demilitarization as a member of 
NATO. Truly committed to the Alliance (Ubriaco, 2017), the ministry intends to ensure 
Lithuania’s security through the support of its fellow Allies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Lithuania, 2017). As NATO’s mandate states that an attack against one is an attack 
against all (NATO, 2018b), the department has the additional responsibility for the collective 
security of the Alliance (Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, 2016). As the 
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circumstances in Kaliningrad put its NATO neighbors Estonia and Latvia in a similar predicament, 
Lithuania has much to gain from pushing for de-escalation. 
Policy Criteria 
The goal of this policy is to decrease East-West tensions surrounding the Baltic arms race.  
Any policy enacted by the Ministry of Defense must align with the department’s mandate 
and capabilities while effectively addressing the problem. There are six criteria the policy must 
satisfy: 
1. Address the problem by reducing the amount of Russian military equipment and personnel 
in and moving towards Kaliningrad. 
2. Benefit Russia so the Kremlin will uphold its end of the bargain. 
3. Benefit Lithuania, and therefore NATO, by working towards the peace and security of the 
Baltic region. 
4. Outline a course of action that can be carried out through the military while working 
towards the peace and security of the Baltic region. 
5. Remain within the department’s financial capabilities, not exceeding the budget of 1.017 
billion Euros (Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, 2020). 
6. Address any economic consequences of decreased defense spending by suggesting 
economic alternatives to military spending if the policy decreases defense spending. 
Policy Options 
Status Quo 
The status quo allows the situation to continue as is, with both NATO and Russia 
continually adding military equipment and personnel to their area of the region. If nothing is done 
to ease tensions, an accidental clash is very probable (Felgengauer, 2016). The possibility of war 
sparked by such a clash is made more dangerous by the fact that Russia, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France have nuclear weapons; nuclear weapons are also based in Italy, 
Germany, Turkey, Belgium, and the Netherlands (Davenport & Reif, 2020). 
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Allowing the arms race to continue as is increases the risk of war between Russia and the 
West each day. Currently, Lithuania and its partners in NATO are on the defensive, increasing 
joint military exercises (NATO, 2018a) only after a new shipment of weapons or troops arrives in 
Kaliningrad (Andersson & Balsyte, 2016). While these exercises take place across the Baltic states, 
the vast majority take place in Lithuania (NATO, 2018a).  
The status quo has substantially increased military spending at the cost of trade, which has 
stimulated Lithuania’s economy. Defense spending jumped from 0.765% of GDP in 2013 to 
2.027% in 2019 (see Fig. 1). Meanwhile, overall trade as a percentage of GDP has declined from 
155.887% in 2013 to 134.454% in 2016. This percentage increased to 149.693% in 2019, 
remaining below pre-Crimea levels (see Fig. 1). While increased military spending has helped the 
economy to grow at a faster rate (see Fig. 2), allowing defense expenditures to eclipse trade is 
dangerous for the peace and security of the region.  
The status quo only fulfills two of the criteria: benefiting Russia and boosting the 
Lithuanian economy. While benefiting Russia is one of the most important criteria, this policy 
does not satisfy the most important criterion: decreasing the amount of Russian military equipment 
in the area. Increased defense spending will continue to destabilize the region, conflicting with the 
Ministry of Defense’s mandate while forcing the Ministry’s budget to grow. 
Policy Option 1: Preemptive Buildup 
Through a preemptive buildup, Lithuania would prompt NATO to purposefully escalate 
the arms race, surrounding Kaliningrad by NATO forces to pressure Russia into negotiations. 
This policy would enable NATO to take the offensive, increasing its own forces not in 
response to Russia’s actions but in anticipation of them. To carry out this policy, the Ministry of 
Defense would call on NATO to surround Kaliningrad on all sides – land, air, and sea. This 
quarantine would prevent any additional Russian military supplies from entering the region. A 




The United States followed a similar policy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. When 
evidence surfaced of Soviet missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy summoned the Organization of 
American States, agreeing upon a naval quarantine of Cuba (Lindsay, 2012). Kennedy informed 
Soviet Premier Khrushchev of the quarantine, demanding that the missiles be removed (Office of 
the Historian). Although the Soviet Union considered this quarantine an “act of aggression” 
(Office of the Historian), the quarantine’s powerful message led to the peaceful termination of the 
crisis. 
A preemptive buildup would only satisfy some of the criteria. Instead of reducing the threat 
of a military confrontation, the policy purposefully escalates the situation to put NATO on the 
offensive. However, the preemptive buildup creates the possibility of a Russian attack. The 
Ministry of Defense, partnered with NATO, has the necessary resources to accomplish the task, 
but it would be exorbitantly expensive and work against stabilizing the Baltics. Still, the influx in 
military spending would boost Lithuania’s economy. 
Policy Option 2: Negotiated De-Escalation 
Through a negotiated de-escalation, Lithuania would guide talks between Russia and 
NATO as they decide upon an amount of military equipment and personnel for each side to remove 
from the region. 
A negotiation between the powers could result in the diffusion of tensions in the region. 
Under this policy, Lithuania would spearhead efforts to arrange a mutual demilitarization. The 
Ministry of Defense would persuade NATO to take the first step by removing a specified amount 
of military equipment and personnel from the area, with the stipulation that Russia do the same. 
As this policy would reverse the arms race, this option would also increase cooperation between 
Russia and the West to improve general relations. 
Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev ended the Cold War through a comparable series of 
negotiations. After Gorbachev’s 1985 inauguration, Reagan initiated a working relationship by 
requesting a meeting (Talbott, 2004), understanding that de-escalation would require collaboration 
(Wilson Center, 2004). He appreciated the sensitivity of the circumstances and took the time to 
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fully understand what Gorbachev wanted. This understanding allowed Reagan to frame his terms 
in a way that would mutually benefit both sides (Talbott, 2004). Eventually, their cooperation 
successfully concluded over 40 years of mistrust. 
A negotiated de-escalation again only satisfies some of the criteria. While this option 
effectively reduces the threat of a military clash through a mutual demilitarization, it would be 
difficult to find terms that satisfy both Russia and Lithuania. Unlike Gorbachev, Putin seems more 
interested in aggravating East-West relations than improving them (Hendrix, p. 1, 2018). However, 
negotiation fits within the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense and, if successful, would work 
toward the security of the region. As this policy gradually decreases defense spending, it would 
remain within the department’s budget. On the other hand, this policy would have a negative effect 
on the Lithuanian economy, which is increasingly dependent on military spending (World Bank, 
2019b; World Bank, 2019d; World Bank, 2019e). 
Policy Option 3: Transit Agreement 
Invoking the transit agreement between Lithuania and Russia would prevent Russia from 
moving additional military goods and personnel through Lithuania. 
Under the transit agreement, the Ministry of Defense would simply assist the government 
in enforcing an existing policy. In 1993, Lithuania and Russia signed a treaty requiring both nations 
to receive permission before transporting goods or people through the other’s territory (Oldberg, 
p. 353-354, 2009). Russia transported a large amount of military goods and personnel through 
Lithuania without Lithuania’s permission during the militarization of Kaliningrad. Despite this 
constant violation of the agreement, Lithuania appears to have done nothing other than threaten to 
invoke the pact (Reuters & RT, 2013). Lithuania could use the agreement to not only halt the 
movement of military equipment into Kaliningrad, but all other goods, as well, unless Russia 
agrees to decrease its military presence in the area. 
A similar agreement negotiated the removal of NATO military equipment from 
Afghanistan. Beginning in 2012, Kyrgyzstan signed a transit pact with NATO allowing the alliance 
to transport military goods through its territory (McDermott, 2012). Although their main transit 
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center at Manas was closed in 2014, the agreement was extended the following year (Lymar, 2015). 
This process both achieved NATO’s objective and established a deeper relationship with Bishkek. 
Like the aforementioned policies, the transit agreement fits some but not all of the criteria. 
Enforcing the existing pact would prevent the threat from escalating. If successful, it would reduce 
the threat by forcing Russia’s military back into mainland Russia. However, depending on the 
terms, this policy may or may not be beneficial to both Russia and Lithuania. Enforcing the transit 
agreement fits within the Ministry of Defense’s mandate by providing military support for the 
security of the nation. Finally, the policy would be financially feasible if Lithuania simply redirects 
military funds previously used elsewhere. However, as demilitarization progresses, the Lithuanian 
economy would suffer from the decrease in defense spending. 
Summary of Policies with Regards to Criteria 
  Status Quo Preemptive Buildup Negotiated De-Escalation Transit Agreement 
Reduces Threat - - + + 
Satisfies Russia + - +/- +/- 
Satisfies Lithuania - - + + 
Fits MOD Mandate - +/- + + 
Financially Feasible - - + + 
Economic Effect + + - - 
Fig. 5 displays how each policy aligns with the aforementioned criteria. Plus signs (+) mean the policy 
satisfies that criterion, while minus signs (-) mean the policy does not. Table compiled by author. 
 
Tradeoffs 
As Fig. 5 shows, not a single option fits all criteria. The status quo and the preemptive 
buildup fulfill the least number of criteria. Neither addresses the problem in a way that will feasibly 
reduce the threat whilst satisfying both parties. Both heighten the risk of unfriendly contact 
between the powers, particularly the preemptive buildup option. However, both policies would 
have a positive impact on the Lithuanian economy. 
The final two options are closer to fulfilling the policy goal but will harm Lithuania’s 
economy. While both the negotiated de-escalation and the transit agreement policies effectively 
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address and reduce the threat, they raise a larger question: Can either satisfy Russia? While 
satisfying Russia is one of the most important criteria, the only option that definitely fulfills it is 
the status quo, which, as has been stated numerous times, is not a viable solution. However, both 
the negotiated de-escalation and transit agreement options easily fit within the Ministry of 
Defense’s mandate and budget. 
Policy Recommendation 
The Proposal for Baltic Stabilization 
The Proposal for Baltic Stabilization is a four-phase policy the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Defense can enact to diffuse the tensions plaguing the Baltics. This policy combines aspects of the 
transit agreement and negotiated de-escalation policy options. 
Phase One: Stopping the Flow of Military Goods 
In the first phase, the Ministry of Defense will support the Lithuanian government in 
enforcing the existing transit pact with Russia. In 1993, Lithuania and Russia signed a treaty in 
which Russia promised to gain Lithuania’s approval before transporting goods across Lithuania 
(Oldberg, p. 353-354, 2009). Although Russia violated this pact in the militarization of 
Kaliningrad, Lithuania has yet to invoke the pact to prevent Russia from moving military goods 
through Lithuania to Kaliningrad (Reuters & RT, 2013). 
Under this policy, the Ministry of Defense will urge the Lithuanian government to use the 
pact to prevent any more Russian military goods from traveling through Lithuania. If Russia 
ignores Lithuania’s demands, the Ministry of Defense will send a small number of military 
personnel to the area. To reduce the risk of accidentally escalating the conflict, Lithuania will also 
request that NATO pause its activities in Lithuania. This modest display of force will show Russia 
that Lithuania is serious about enforcing the policy. 
Phase Two: Stopping the Flow of All Goods 
If Phase One is unsuccessful, the Ministry of Defense will transition to the second phase, 
in which more troops are deployed, and Lithuania invokes the pact again. This time, the 
government will prevent the transport of any goods from Russia to Kaliningrad through Lithuania. 
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Russia did agree to the transit pact when it was signed in 1993. If Russia refuses to heed Lithuania’s 
requests, then it risks being seen as a nation that does not respect treaties. Once this phase is put 
into effect, Kaliningrad will be completely closed off to Russia by land. This stricter approach 
leads to the third part of the policy, which proposes a negotiated de-escalation. 
Phase Three: Negotiating a Mutual Demilitarization 
Once Lithuania has asserted itself as a major power in the Baltics, the third phase will open 
negotiations between the powers. The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense will work with NATO to 
determine an amount of NATO equipment to be removed from the Baltics. Lithuania will then 
reach out to Russia to issue the following: NATO will remove this amount of military goods if 
Russia agrees to return the same amount to mainland Russia. This aspect of the policy is meant to 
reverse the arms race by removing substantial amounts of Russian and NATO military equipment 
and personnel from the area. This demilitarization leads to the fourth and final phase of the policy, 
which provides economic alternatives to military spending. 
Phase Four: Encouraging Trade 
Encouraging trade between Kaliningrad and the West will offset the consequences of 
demilitarization on the Russian and Lithuanian economies while building trust. The already-
suffering Russian economy hurt itself further by closing off Kaliningrad to Western trade (Kelly, 
2016). Lithuania will express a willingness to open trade once more with Kaliningrad as a show 
of trust. If Russia is interested, Lithuania will request that Poland do the same. Opening 
Kaliningrad to Western trade will also lessen the potential impact of pro-Western movements in 
Belarus on Kaliningrad’s economy. Kaliningrad will be less dependent on overland trade across 
Belarus and more amenable to trade with more democratic states, whether or not Belarus is 
included in this group. 
The Timeline 
After the initial invocation of the transit pact, the Ministry of Defense must be prepared to 
support the Proposal for Baltic Stabilization for a minimum of six years. As Russia will most likely 
resist heeding the transit agreement, it is projected that Phases One and Two will require two years 
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to take full effect. The completion of the first two phases will significantly reduce the amount of 
Russian military equipment moving towards Kaliningrad.  
Phase Three will then reduce the amount of Russian military equipment and personnel in 
Kaliningrad. After a negotiation period of three months between Lithuania and NATO regarding 
what will be removed, Lithuania will initiate a parallel three-month negotiation stage with Russia. 
It will then take two years for both sides to completely remove the agreed-upon equipment from 
their respective sides. Finally, an additional two years will be needed to resume normal trading 
patterns between Kaliningrad and the West. 
Fulfilling the Criteria 
As stated before, both the transit agreement and negotiated de-escalation options fulfill 
most of the criteria. However, neither option could guarantee Russian cooperation, and both would 
have a negative impact on the Lithuanian economy.  
The Proposal for Baltic Stabilization resolves both problems. Through Lithuania invoking 
the transit pact and NATO offering to take the first step in demilitarization, the West pressures 
Russia to comply. The final phase settles the economic consequences on both sides, offering 
economic alternatives to military spending through reopening Kaliningrad to Western trade. These 
economic alternatives will further incentivize Russia to cooperate. 
Monitoring 
The Ministry of Defense will also be responsible for monitoring the proposal’s success, 
which entails collecting the following data on an annual basis after the enforcement of the policy 
begins: 
1. The amount of Russian military equipment and personnel that has entered Kaliningrad. 
2. The amount of Russian military equipment and personnel returned to mainland Russia. 
3. Changes in the economies (GDP, trade, military spending) of Lithuania and Kaliningrad. 
The first two items will be collected through military intelligence, while the economic data 




The Proposal for Baltic Stabilization will be evaluated by the following: 
1. Has the flow of military equipment moving towards Kaliningrad slowed and/or stopped? 
2. How much military equipment has been returned to mainland Russia? 
3. How has the policy affected Lithuania’s economy? 
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